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Poietic epistemology: reading Hus-
serl Through Adorno and Heidegger
Joanna Hodge
in this sense phenomenology sets about breaking out of a fetishism of 
concepts. it shakes up the ornaments, which take on in the domain 
of abstract conceptuality a mask-like, pernicious articulation of mere 
surface appearance, as the architecture and the music of the same period 
did with respect to sensuous ornamentations.1
introduction
These remarks fall into four brief sections after this introduction: a 
section on framing, a section on style, a section on some differences be-
tween three stages in Adorno’s responses to Husserl, and a short, inconclu-
sive excursus on Kant. Adorno’s diagnosis of Husserl’s phenomenology is 
well enough known: that it is an idealism driven to the point of subvert-
ing idealism. Less clear is what, in Adorno’s considered view, is to take the 
place of such an outmoded idealism; nor is it clear that Adorno’s subse-
quent return to a version of Kant’s critical philosophy is to be preferred to 
the program launched by Husserl.2 The point of this chapter is to suggest 
a reassessment of Husserl’s phenomenology, via a re-reading of Adorno’s 
critique, which i shall explicitly discuss, and in the light of Heidegger’s ap-
propriation of Husserl, which will have to remain less to the fore. The aim 
is to assess Adorno’s critique of Husserl, and to suggest an odd collabora-
tion between Heidegger and Adorno, which obscures the genuine inno-
chapter four
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vation at work in the notions of categorial intuition and of passive syn-
thesis. i suggest that neither the appropriation of Husserlian themes, by 
Heidegger, nor the rejection of Husserl’s phenomenology, by Adorno, does 
justice to the distinctiveness of Husserl’s work. This can be shown to pro-
vide an account of a new formalism, as pure grammar, which is no longer 
held in place by Aristotelian or Hegelian distinctions between form and 
matter, concept and nature, cause and effect. This formalism can then be 
shown to be resistant both to any dialectical operation or modification and 
to the standard critiques of, for example, Kantian formalisms with respect 
to thinking of space and time and with respect to ethics.3 This resistance 
results from Husserl shifting the frame of inquiry from a theory of cogni-
tion to a theory of meaning, and from a correspondence theory of truth to 
one of ideal fulfillments. Adorno’s emphasis on reading Husserl as a theo-
rist of cognition shows up what is wrong in the diagnosis and paradoxically 
reveals the radical innovation of thinking questions of cognition through 
questions of meaningfulness.
Adorno and Heidegger are perhaps understandably over-impressed 
by the systematic presentations of phenomenology made by Husserl in 
the Logical Investigations of 1900/1901 and in Ideas: General Introduction 
to Pure Phenomenology of 1913. They are thus less attuned to the intellec-
tual struggle and the philosophical work to be found stretched out across 
Husserl’s writings, in the preparatory drafts and lecture cycles.4 A reading 
of Husserl’s work, by contrast, across the published writings, rather than 
reading each as a separate event, leads to a less distorting, more open-end-
ed notion of what Husserl’s phenomenology consists in. it permits a con-
sideration of what remains constant and what evolves in the course of a 
fifty-year struggle to formulate a philosophical breakthrough. This kind of 
transverse reading leads into the notion of a poietic epistemology, as given 
in my title, one which constructs itself in the practices of thinking, under-
taken by each bearer of thought, for themselves, and it leads up to a notion 
of phenomenology, as that which is in process of formation. There is then 
an important difference to be marked between the temporal conditions 
for knowledge claims based on cognition, which have a certain universal-
ity and non-localizability in terms of time and historical context, and the 
temporal conditions for the fulfillment of meaning intentions, which are 
simultaneously universal and temporally neutral with respect to meaning 
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content, and temporally singular to the occasion of each fulfillment. i shall 
show that these temporal differences have not received the attention they 
deserve. This connects to a difference between the notions of time and 
space deployed in relation to Kant’s notion of intuition and the determina-
tions of time under development in Husserl’s notion of intuition. in con-
clusion to these remarks, i shall draw attention to a gap between Husserl’s 
thought and that of Kantian idealism, not noticed by Adorno, by attend-
ing to a complication of the notion of intuition in the famous ‘Principle of 
all Principles’ from section 24 of Husserl’s Ideas I.
Framing the discussion
i shall make one remark about this notion of transverse reading, one 
about the notion of the poietic, and one about Adorno’s mode of reading 
Husserl and Heidegger as conjoined, before proceeding further. one im-
plication of the notion of transverse reading is that phenomenology is not 
to be understood as completed system or doctrine, and does not propose 
itself as attempting to provide either of these. This renders suspect Ador-
no’s mode of reading Husserl as subscribing to what he calls, in 1924, a 
transcendental systematics, a term that drops out of the later readings. The 
1924 text, under the title “die Transzendenz des dinglichen und noema-
tischen in Husserls Phänomenologie” (“The Transcendence of Thingliness 
and the noematic in Husserl’s Phenomenology”) presents a markedly dif-
ferent reading of Husserl from that proposed in the later text from 1956.5 
Thus Adorno’s reading of Husserl, too, is marked by an evolution in time, 
and by shifts of perspective, which may not be as internally consistent as 
the shifts identifiable in Husserl’s writings. Husserl’s writings can be seen 
to propose a system as a series of temporal relays, whereas those of Adorno 
appear to wander from a neo-Kantianism in the 1920s, to a Hegelianism 
in the 1930s and 1940s, and back to a different version of neo-Kantianism 
in the 1950s and 1960s. one distinctive feature of twentieth-century phi-
losophy is that, in place of completed systems or delimited position state-
ments, philosophy has tended to be written under the sign of incomplete-
ness, and thus has the open-ended form of a practice which requires the 
active participation of its inheritors. This is filled out by Husserl’s account 
of the necessary reactivation of meanings and the fulfillments of meaning 
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intuitions, in sense-giving acts, to secure sense. nor is there any such de-
finitive separation of philosophical domains of inquiry, which Adorno’s 
notion of a critique of a theory of cognition seems to presuppose. i will, 
however, attribute an epistemology in formation to each of these three 
thinkers, Husserl, Heidegger, Adorno, for they write in the form of a prac-
tice requiring the active participation of its inheritors. However, none of 
them proposes an epistemology as free standing with respect to other di-
mensions of philosophical enquiry.
For Adorno, epistemology cuts off analysis of knowledge from its ac-
tual historical and political conditions, thus attempting to take meaning 
as a given, rather than as historically constituted. For Heidegger, there is 
a different sense in which epistemology cuts theorizing off from consid-
eration of the sources of meaningfulness for the terms in which it is ana-
lyzed. in Being and Time this is done in terms of a priority for the notion 
of being-in-the-world, which later drops out in favour of the notion of the 
sendings of being, and their historical determinations (Geschick / Geschichte 
des Seins). The dispute between Adorno and Heidegger on how to under-
stand these connections between knowledge, meaning, and history must 
regretfully be left to one side.6 For Husserl, unlike, for example, Kant and 
Hume, the enterprises of epistemology and ontology do not separate off 
from one another, and one result of Adorno’s emphasis on the limitations 
of epistemology as Erkenntniskritik is to draw attention to this. A poietic 
epistemology, then, is one which is by no means neutral with respect to 
ontological commitments, nor yet to the efforts of individual inquirers to 
make sense of transmitted and invented meanings. The two main aims of 
this chapter, then, are to propose a re-reading of Husserl; making out a 
case for considering the term ‘poietic epistemology’ as capturing what is 
distinctive about Husserl’s work.
‘Poietic’ is then intended as a reprise of the greek notion of innova-
tive making, each time for the first time, as opposed to a notion of collec-
tively constituted praxis, of repeatable actions. The emphasis is on a dif-
ference between an activity, poiesis, for which the rules are not pre-formed 
and are coextensive with the activity itself, and a practice, praxis, for which 
there are externally valorized criteria of what counts as well formed with-
in the practice. in this sense of poiesis, there is no problem with distinc-
tive modes of formulation, for example the register of Hölderlin’s writing, 
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or indeed that of Samuel Beckett. indeed, the point at issue is that which 
resists interpretation and appropriation, whereas, when both are subordi-
nated under some more general term such as ‘poetic writing,’ there is a loss 
of the distinctive point of either, in an analysis of the rules of formation of 
some such generic practice. My thought then is that knowledge and mean-
ing are more fully revealed for what they are in such practices of writing, 
where the commonalities between writers are less important than their dis-
tinctiveness, than in practices like rowing a boat, where isomorphism of 
movement is normative for the practice.
While Adorno emphasizes Husserl’s alignment to Erkenntniskritik, 
he is also in the habit of running a reading of Husserl and of Heidegger 
together, and while this too might be contested, it does have the virtue of 
preventing a split between an ontological and an epistemological phenom-
enology setting in. He treats the ontological emphasis of the phenomenol-
ogy of Heidegger and the epistemological emphasis in that of Husserl as 
complementary, intertwined, and equally unsatisfactory. My view is, rath-
er, that Husserl is no less concerned with ontology than Heidegger is, and 
that Heidegger is as concerned with the modes of presentation to awareness 
as Husserl is. indeed, the analyses in Being and Time of the modes of ev-
erydayness, of indifference, and of ecstatic exteriorization are nothing less 
than diagnoses of such different presentational modes.7 neither Heidegger 
nor Husserl, of course, is a classical metaphysician in the style of Leibniz, 
nor yet a theorist of knowledge in the style of Hume, or indeed in the 
mode of any of the twentieth-century positivists. Thus Adorno’s attempt 
to read Husserl as an exponent of epistemology is significantly distort-
ing, all the more so if, instead of ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowledge,’ 
‘Erkenntnistheorie’ is translated more restrictedly as ‘theory of cognition.’ 
For this elides the role of the methodology of reduction, in guaranteeing 
evidence, and that of imaginary variation and of fantasy presentation in 
the articulation of Husserl’s analyses of meaning.8 The attempt to foreclose 
Husserl’s writings under such a rubric is significant, and is to be explored 
and transformed in the following remarks. it is undermined by Adorno’s 
own insistence on the continuity between Husserl and Heidegger. Thus i 
shall attempt, in part, to mobilize one part of Adorno’s critique of Husserl 
against another, and, in part, to give Husserl the right of reply to Ador-
no’s critique. This is legitimated by the posthumous publication of lecture 
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notes, to some although not all of which Adorno could not have had ac-
cess. My thought is that Husserl’s phenomenology is less caught up in the 
constraints of his historical moment than Adorno supposes.
Adorno has one line of argument with Husserl, and another with 
Hegel, about how to think dialectically. By contrast to the notion of sus-
pended dialectics, explored by Adorno in Negative Dialectics (1966), Hus-
serl has a rather different proposal to make concerning a movement from 
thinking to thought, and back, which, although not strictly speaking dia-
lectical, captures some of the force of what Adorno seeks to retrieve from 
Hegelian dialectic while avoiding more effectively the absolutist tenden-
cy of any attempted appropriation of Hegelian dialectic, as a complet-
ed accomplishment.9 Adorno disputes the notion of a Hegelian dialectic 
as a historically completed accomplishment in the labyrinthine complexi-
ties of Negative Dialectics, under the slogan “Philosophie, die einmal über-
holt schien, erhält sich am Leben, weil der Moment ihrer Verwirklichung 
versäumt ward.” (“Philosophy, which once seemed overcome, remains alive 
since its moment of actualisation was missed”).10 Husserl would, of course, 
dispute both parts of this remark: he would dispute that philosophy could 
ever have been overcome, and he would also dispute that its moment of 
accomplishment could be thought to be unique, and could therefore have 
been missed. The attempt to use Hegel’s notion of dialectic against Hus-
serl, when Husserl is in dispute with Adorno about how to reinterpret it, 
is thus illegitimate.
Adorno fails to appreciate the nuance in Husserl’s writings with re-
spect to differences between natural and transcendental meaning, which 
recalls the better-known parallel between empirical and reduced pure con-
sciousness. natural meanings are given in historically specific contexts, 
and are subject to erosion and to what Husserl comes to call sedimenta-
tion; ideal transcendental meaning is given as limit condition for any such 
historical meaning, as its unspoken condition of possibility. Adorno also 
misses Husserl’s nuance with respect to the accomplishments of think-
ing in relation to time, temporal process, and the constitution of a pure 
time, which does not, as Adorno supposes, deny a specificity of historical 
circumstance nor yet the workings of duration. For these are irreducible 
in the invention, preservation, and indeed distortion of meaning, which 
takes place in sedimentation. i shall argue that Adorno’s challenge to Hus-
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serl is worthy of close attention, but mainly in order to dispute various 
common misrepresentations of Husserl’s phenomenology. it is spread out 
over three phases: in the 1920s, with his doctoral work; in the 1930s, when 
he reads the Cartesian Meditations (1931) in French, and wrongly deduces 
from it that Husserl was simply endorsing a return to a Cartesian dualism; 
and in the 1950s, when he publishes his Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheo-
rie, taking Husserl as exemplary of a certain historical foreclosure in theo-
rizing knowledge.
oddly, Adorno does not foreground the historical constraints within 
which each of these phases of his engagement with Husserl are to be placed, 
and he does not modify the critique in the light of the different aspects of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, available to him in, respectively, the 1920s, the 
1930s, and the 1950s. Born in 1903, Adorno could have, but appears not to 
have, attended Husserl’s Lectures on Passive Synthesis from 1920–21, repeat-
ed in 1923, and in the winter semester, 1925–26.11 He could also have at-
tended the lectures of 1923–24, First Philosophy, parts one and two, on the 
Critical History of ideas, and on the Phenomenological reduction.12 He is 
thus precluded from grasping what iso Kern calls the threefold route into 
Husserl’s phenomenology—that of a historical retrieval of the Cartesian 
intervention, that of descriptive intentional psychology, and that of reduc-
tion—all of which are designed to arrive at the same result: a retrieval of 
the task of philosophy.13 Adorno rather seems to shift between the descrip-
tive phenomenology of Logical Investigations and the Cartesian moves of 
the later texts, precisely failing to grasp their systematic intent. nor does 
he mark the impact of eugen Fink’s publication in 1939, in the first issue 
of the Revue internationale de philosophie, of Husserl’s now-famous essay 
“on the origin of geometry,” in which he begins to elaborate publicly 
the notions of genesis and of history, towards which he was still working 
at the time of his death in 1938.14 After the defeat of nazism, eugen Fink 
returned to teach in Freiburg im Breisgau, from 1946 on, and Adorno re-
turned to Frankfurt am Main from exile in the United States.15 i shall at-
tempt to draw attention to the manner in which the changing historical 
and political conditions from the 1920s to the 1930s to the 1950s might 
have changed the manner in which Adorno approaches Husserl.
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Stylistic Specificities: introducing  
Poietic epistemology
The remark from Adorno with which i began seeks, as might be ex-
pected, to pick out something philosophically distinctive about Husserl’s 
prose style. it is not, however, entirely clear which of the various artistic 
movements of the early twentieth-century Adorno is identifying Husserl 
with. The intended comparison is probably with the Bauhaus School of 
architecture and with the Second Vienna School of composition. in these, 
there is to be found a reduction of the components of composition to a 
minimum, along with the development of a rigorous set of rules for the 
use and arrangement of those components. This undoubtedly captures a 
feature of Husserl’s inquiries. i take the suggestion to be that there is in 
Husserl’s writings a bare economy of style, with the form of a modernist 
minimalism, which indeed contrasts strikingly with the baroque flourishes 
of Adorno’s struggles with language, and contrasts both to a fausse naïveté 
of Heidegger’s later style and to the neo-scholastic tone, in the earlier writ-
ings, in evidence both in the Marburg lectures and in Being and Time. For 
Husserl, form follows function, and function is determined by a commit-
ment to analyzing how meaning works. it would then be necessary on an-
other occasion to show how latter-day phenomenology has complement-
ed, or supplemented, this with attention to an unworking of meaning, 
where the uncertainty and indeterminacy of notions of world and hori-
zon disrupt the terms regionalized within the wider context, with Samuel 
Beckett, Maurice Blanchot, and Jean-Luc nancy to the fore. in the inter-
ests of concision and focus, i shall have to leave this now to one side.
in terms of style, then, Husserl is a philosopher who manages to ar-
rive in the twentieth century, for good or ill, whereas Adorno and Hei-
degger, in my view, are locked in struggle with their respective debts to 
german idealism and Marxian terminology, to Christian dogmatics and 
greek thought, and with what has to be an ever-present sense of inferiority 
in relation to nietzsche’s way with words. Husserl, by contrast, is intimi-
dated neither by greek thought nor by a Christian inheritance, and, while 
perhaps a reader of nietzsche, he is sufficiently a man of his own world not 
to be robbed by nietzsche of the capacity to write. reading Husserl, in the 
various redrafting of his texts, and in their various degrees of incomplete-
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ness, reveals a craftsman of great skill, with respect to both words and con-
cepts, with respect to both syntax and the articulation of argument. He ar-
rives at an expression of thought of the highest order and the utmost rigor, 
saying neither more nor less than is licensed by his own protocols, in the 
twisting together of words and concepts, syntax, and line of argument. A 
diagnosis of a supervenience of mind, of intellectual processes, on physi-
ological electrical brain states is a well-known conceit; an analysis of a su-
pervenience of ideal concepts on the words of natural language, and of rig-
orous argument on arbitrary syntactical sequence is philosophically more 
telling, and is made available by Husserl’s writings from Logical Investiga-
tions on. Pure logical grammar supervenes on the grammar of natural lan-
guages but is not identical to that of any one natural language.
As indicated, poietic epistemology imposes on each postulant bearer 
of knowledge the task and effort of forming apparently inchoate streams 
of sensory material into patterns and configurations, which can then be 
deployed to make a claim on conceptual status. in Husserl’s case this then 
retrospectively reveals that there are transcendental structures implicit in 
those streams, given in advance of analysis, and holding these classifica-
tory possibilities in place, in accordance with a logic of parts and wholes 
and a practice of imaginative variation. These structures play an irreduc-
ible role in permitting these patterns and configurations to come into form 
and to be held in place, for the attention of natural consciousness. indeed, 
they ground the orderliness both of natural consciousness and of its con-
tents, as presentations of what there is. These structures are then expressed 
and transmitted in natural languages, but those languages become alien-
ated and alienating forms of transmission of meaning when the activity of 
forming meaning and identifying patterns is surrendered to the mecha-
nisms of stabilizing meaning in definitive, not provisional, determinations 
of meaning. An open-ended process of writing concepts and rigorous or-
derliness into existence is what the term ‘poietic’ in my title is intended 
to capture, and it seems especially apposite to attend to this process, in 
its rather different guises, in the writings of Husserl, of Heidegger, and of 
Adorno. For each is in process of generating a distinctive philosophical in-
tervention, by a refinement and transformation of the available resources 
for linguistic expression.
The word ‘generation,’ here, is to be preferred to a word such as ‘pro-
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duction,’ for all the usual reasons: that production suggests working in 
accordance with a pre-given schema. By contrast i seek here to draw at-
tention to these various attempts at invention of new possibilities of sche-
matization, in response to reconfigurations of spatio-temporal relations, 
in relation to the kinds of entities that are identified within them, and in 
response to corresponding intensifications and distentions of sensibility. 
roughly speaking, these developments call for a recasting of the account 
of transcendental aesthetics, as first set out by Kant, in the first Critique, 
to which i read Husserl as making a major contribution, but that would 
be a topic for another, much longer paper.16 i already have here then three 
unfulfillable promissory notes: on an unworking of meaning, to be thema-
tized with the help of Beckett, Blanchot, and nancy; on supervenience, a 
notion borrowed from analytical philosophy, for an account of a logic of 
sense, in relation to natural language; and on a reconfiguration of tran-
scendental aesthetics, to be explored as a reception of, and reworking of, 
the meanings bequeathed to philosophy by Kant’s transcendental innova-
tions. These three mark the as-yet-unclaimed strengths of a Husserlian in-
heritance, and they provide the three main strands of a proposed defense of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, from the combined critiques, and random com-
binations of themes, in which such critiques often consist, from Adorno 
and Bergson; from Heidegger and Sartre.
There is of course an irony in the fact that it is Heidegger who draws 
attention to the proximity between such poiesis and thinking, in his re-
flections in the later writings on the word Dichtung, and on the poetry of 
Hölderlin; and that Adorno analyzes the possibilities and restrictions im-
posed by stylistic difference, while also engaging in polemics against Hei-
degger about Hölderlin. i suggest, however, that, between them, Adorno 
and Heidegger split word from flow of thought, concept from its embed-
ding in syntax; they are, in short, caught in the toils of an all-too-Kantian 
set of antinomies, which Husserl—by starting again from the beginning, 
and by rethinking imagination, intuition, synthesis, transcendentalism, 
apriorism—can turn around. Husserl, then, is the thinker with whom 
these antinomies of a philosophical inheritance are to be resolved. This, of 
course, again, has its comic edge against Adorno’s critique of Husserl, as 
developed in the 1930s, which is predicated on the presumption that the 
antagonisms of the real cannot be registered in the unmediated insights 
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postulated by Husserlian intuition.17 i shall, however, deploy the notion 
of antinomy in support of Husserl and as a defense against Adorno’s cri-
tique. nevertheless, Adorno does have a serious reading of Husserl, which 
is not simply to be put to one side, even if it is somewhat selective in its 
choice of texts to read, and overburdened by an uncritical commitment 
to the rightness of certain Hegelian notions: the concept, dialectics, and 
mediation, just for example. Adorno’s reading repays careful scrutiny, not 
simply because of the scope of its influence, and only a sketch of this can 
be attempted here.
Three Stages in Adorno’s reading of Husserl,  
Three Points of Contestation
The three stages of Adorno’s reading of Husserl are made up of the 
work going into the doctoral dissertation of 1924, already mentioned; the 
papers written in oxford in the 1930s; and his Zur Metakritik der Erken-
ntnistheorie, from 1956. The pieces from the 1930s—one written in 1937, 
which forms the basis of part four of Zur Metakritik, and another pub-
lished in 1940, in, of all places, the Journal of Philosophy—are extensive-
ly commented on in Adorno’s exchange of letters with Walter Benjamin, 
making clear the degree of Adorno’s investment in his critique.18 The texts 
read by Adorno are principally Logical Investigations and Cartesian Medi-
tations, to which he had access in the French translation by emmanuel 
Levinas, from 1931. To a lesser extent, he draws on the 1913 first volume 
of Ideas. in 1955, he could but appears not to have consulted the recently 
published volumes of the complete Husserl edition, The Idea of Phenom-
enology (HUA ii), the second and third books of Ideas (HUA iV and V) 
and the critical edition of The Crisis of the European Sciences (HUA Vi).19 
Striking is the layered nature of Adorno’s Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnis-
theorie, and the manner in which the focus for critique shifts. The empha-
sis is on a theory of cognition and of transcendental systematics early on; 
the notion of antinomy and the use of the Hegelian concept of mediation 
comes to the fore in the 1930s; and a refusal to distinguish between Kan-
tian and Husserlian apriorism, and transcendentalism, comes out most 
clearly in the reframing of the analysis in the 1950s. The doctoral disser-
tation of 1924 was prepared under the direction of Hans Cornelius, who 
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had famously found Benjamin’s Origin of German Tragic Drama to be “an 
incomprehensible morass.” it is then legitimate to wonder what sense he 
may have made of Husserl, and what degree of agreement with his own po-
sition he expected of his doctoral students. it would be instructive to read 
Cornelius’s critique of Husserl, to discover how much of Adorno’s reading 
is determined by the moves made in it.20 While in the 1930s Adorno reads 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations in emmanuel Levinas’s French translation, 
when it comes to publication in 1956, he makes use of the german edi-
tion, which has in the meantime appeared, for some but not all of his cita-
tions. it is just one of those ironies of intellectual history that Levinas here 
gives comfort to the Hegelian onslaught against Husserl; it also raises the 
question what Levinas might have made of the welding together of Hus-
serl and Hegel by eugen Fink. The fraught relation between Husserl and 
Heidegger must also remain to one side, since their various mutual accusa-
tions of anthropologism lead into difficulties and complexities well beyond 
the compass of this chapter.21
There are two problems with Adorno’s reading, one concerning his 
notion of logic and another concerning his notion of consciousness. Ador-
no refuses the notion of a transcendental logic, and reads Husserl’s notion 
of logic as if it were a discursive logic and a logic of argumentation. How-
ever, both Husserl and Kant have a richer notion of logic, to which Ador-
no is reluctant to do justice, since it competes more strongly than a dis-
cursive logic of argumentation with the residual notion of dialectical logic 
that he, Adorno, extracts from the remnants of Hegel’s system. Here it 
would be necessary to interpolate a reading of Husserl’s Formal and Tran-
scendental Logic, and of the sections published as appendices to that in the 
german edition in 1974, now translated into english as the introduction 
to the 1920–21 lectures, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses: 
Lectures on Transcendental Logic, by Anthony Steinbock.22 Similarly, Ador-
no’s commitment to a kind of philosophy of consciousness, which is re-
fracted through the trickery of false consciousness, leads him to miss the 
manner in which Husserl has a thinking of consciousness as giving access 
to the structure of reality itself. Where, for Adorno predication and objec-
tivity can come apart, for Husserl the conditions of meaningfulness just 
are the conditions for the constitution of objectivities in their ontological 
independence. What distinguishes Husserl from the naïveté of ordinary 
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language philosophy is that he distinguishes between empirical and tran-
scendental meaning, between Bedeutung and Sinn; thus his conception of 
meaning is not mortgaged to the constraints of any particular natural lan-
guage. Husserl has a theory of meaning, not a theory of cognition, and is 
thus not restricted to the limits set out by a theory of knowledge nor to 
those of any particular natural language. Adorno identifies this Kantian 
moment in Husserl’s thinking, but rather than also identifying the differ-
ences between Husserl and Kant, especially on the question of the status 
of a thinking of time and space, in relation to the constitution of what 
there is, Adorno seems to presume that since Hegel is an improvement 
on Kant, so Hegel must also be an improvement on Husserl. one of the 
aims of this reading then is to reopen the question of the connection be-
tween Husserl and Hegel, who, for Adorno of course, are entirely distinct, 
whereas, as noted, for eugen Fink, they are oddly close. The distance be-
tween Frankfurt and Freiburg is undoubtedly greater after the World War 
ii than before.
For Husserl, by contrast to the Hegelian enmeshing of conscious-
ness in an account of freedom and history, consciousness is articulated 
along the lines of a transcendental logic, which simultaneously maps the 
contours of consciousness, and the contours of what there is. in so far as 
any empirical thinking fails to measure up to the structure of reality, and 
fails to attend to the things themselves, it has remained anchored in nat-
ural prejudice, and failed to attend to the intimations of this rigorously 
given logic of possible meanings. Thus for Husserl there can be no split 
between thinking what there is, and analyzing the contents of conscious-
ness, whereas of course, for Adorno, it is these gaps between thinking and 
what there is that generate antinomy, political delusions, and social catas-
trophes, the genesis of which he seeks to trace out. These differences point 
up the importance of a properly conceived transcendental logic, and point 
up the gap not just between what Husserl intends with ‘consciousness’ and 
what it means for Adorno, but also between Kant and Husserl on the no-
tion of the transcendental. on this topic Husserl is loquacious from Logi-
cal Investigations onwards, so it is, to put it mildly, odd that Adorno refuses 
to distinguish sharply between them, and then, perversely, prefers Kant.
Adorno thus misses the point of Husserl’s innovations and fails to 
understand the importance of the stylistic specificity of Husserl’s thinking, 
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even while pointing it out. He also manages to be quite alarmingly offen-
sive, in his deployment of sexual innuendo and political diatribe, in ways 
that on reflection are rather more comically apposite against their author, 
sheltering in oxford during the dark days of nazism, rather than against 
Husserl, who seems to me to be one of those rare figures who are as ad-
mirable as they are self-absorbed. Writing for publication in 1956, Adorno 
claims in part four of Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie that Husserl was 
“already surpassed before the arrival of Hitler,” thus oddly agreeing with 
Martin Heidegger, whose views on the inadequacies of Husserl’s phenom-
enology are a matter of ungracious record. Adorno is skeptical with respect 
to Husserl’s attempt to re-establish philosophy as a systematic, organized 
discipline, and to align it as rigorous Wissenschaft, in the phrase of the 1911 
Logos article. Adorno reads this attempt as a failure to grasp the historical 
conditions for philosophical work and as a failure to take up the inheri-
tance of dialectical thinking, a discussion of which forms the third part of 
his meta-critique of Husserl’s philosophy.
There are then connections between these three aspects of Husserl’s 
thinking, as contested by Adorno: the identification of Husserl as con-
cerned with Erkenntnistheorie, already opened up for discussion; the scope 
of the concept of rigorous science; and a problem concerning the inter-
pretation of Husserl’s commitment to idealism, which, as noted, is over-
swiftly identified with a certain view of Kant’s idealism. The contestation 
concerning what it means to claim philosophy to be Wissenschaftlich also 
turns on a question of translation, for it can mean ‘scientific’ and it can 
mean ‘systematic’ but perhaps in this context it is best translated as ‘having 
the form of rigorous disciplinarity.’ The point is most swiftly made by not-
ing that mathematics is the standard appealed to by Husserl most often, 
and that mathematics is no more a natural science than historical inquiry 
is. The appeal to mathematics gives access to a notion of transcendental 
meaning, neutral between natural languages, with no ontological regional-
ization. Adorno seems to assume that the commitment to a rigorous disci-
plinarity must mean that there is no room for a role for, and understanding 
of, historical difference, and this Husserl contests, even and especially in 
relation to geometry. This indicates Adorno’s commitment to a misguided 
notion of scientificity, affirming some neo-Kantian dualism concerning 
natural and historical science. it also secures as unchallenged Hegel’s no-
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tion of rigorous disciplinarity, as in a “System der Wissenschaften.” one of 
the various disservices rendered by eugen Fink is a covering over of this 
contestation between Husserl and Hegel on the topics of the status of both 
logic and Wissenschaftlichkeit.
Adorno’s critique of Husserl in the 1920s takes as its focus the suppos-
edly undecided status of the inquiries between idealism and realism. This 
criticism highlights Adorno’s impatience with Husserl’s project of develop-
ing an idealism, compatible with a materialism, about the nature of what 
there is, and with a realism, of some kind, about the contents of knowledge 
claims. Adorno focuses attention on the supposition of an interdependen-
cy of immediately given contents, as the first presumption of transcen-
dental method, and seeks to put pressure on the notion of immediacy. He 
remarks that this emphasis leads to a relative neglect of the notion of an in-
sight into essences (Wesensschau) and of the theory of abstraction through 
which Husserl seeks to explain how, from the empirical definiteness of par-
ticular experiences, it is all the same possible to form general ideas, under 
which such particulars may be subsumed. Unlike Heidegger in the intro-
duction to the lectures The Phenomenology of Religion, Adorno does not 
identify as a strength Husserl’s distinction between the processes of a gen-
eralization of ideas from particulars, and of a formalization of ideas, each 
on the basis of their givenness, in concrete meaning contexts. This distinc-
tion is implicit in Logical Investigations and is made explicit in section 13 
of Ideas I, through the development of the phenomenological reduction, 
prior to demonstrating, in a second reduction, their transcendental and, 
for Husserl, ontologically determinate status.23 Adorno also queries the 
distinction in the formulation of the ‘Principle of all Principles’ from Ideas 
I, between the phenomenal givenness of original perceivings, and the sup-
position that nevertheless access is thereby given to ‘things.’ This i think 
shows a misapprehension concerning the purpose and function of phe-
nomenological reduction, which does not so much deny the existence of 
things in the world as deny their relevance in the process of explaining how 
there comes to be access to and knowledge of things, without simply pre-
supposing knowledge of what there is to be accessed. Husserl not unrea-
sonably supposes that it is a mistake to presume knowledge of things in the 
world by which to measure the adequacy of the knowledge supposedly to 
be derived. The phenomenological reduction then is to be understood as 
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eliminating assumptions about that which is to be known rather than de-
nying its status as independent of empirical consciousness. The next stage 
of the argument proceeds to a reduction of these phenomenally and phe-
nomenologically given contents of consciousness, to reveal their transcen-
dental conditions, given as the orderliness of what there is.
Adorno’s reading of Husserl in the 1920s focuses on the status of the 
‘thing,’ a theme for Kant but not for Husserl, and it generates a series of 
perplexities connected to the distinction between the ‘thing’ and the ‘no-
ema.’ However, this distinction and the perplexities generated by it can 
occur only when Husserl’s own distinction between empirical or psycho-
logical givenness and determinate meaning relations has been undercut.24 
This reading reveals a failure to understand the point and nature of the 
project of reduction, whereby both empirical contingency and the opac-
ity and unreachability of the Kantian thing in itself are eliminated in favor 
of an analysis of the possibility of determinate meaning. The engagement 
with Husserl culminates towards the end of the second section of Adorno’s 
treatment with the following remark: “it is evident that the opposition be-
tween noema and noesis cannot be made the leading principle for a theory 
of knowledge; the leading principle is much more the opposition between 
thingly and phenomenal being.”25 Adorno thus both refuses the shift of 
domain of inquiry brought about by Husserl’s neologisms, noesis and no-
ema, and refuses the program of reduction that would make him hesitate 
to invoke as neutral between things and appearing this term ‘being.’ He 
continues: “Concerning ‘noema’ in the sense in which we are allowed to 
use the word, as the content of all mediated givenness, we know of it only 
through intentional lived experience, in which it comes to givenness; no-
esis and noema are thus inseparable. We can then for the rest of our inves-
tigation do without the term ‘noema.’ “26 it is again, to put it mildly, odd 
that Adorno should rehearse against Husserl’s distinction the very feature 
that Husserl supposes to be its strength, indeed the very point of inventing 
it: the inseparability of noesis, as act, and noema, as determinate content of 
conscious activity. Furthermore, their identity conditions are not the same, 
since a number of distinct acts can intend the same meaning content; nor 
do they display the same temporal properties. it is furthermore the task 
for a transcendental logic to regulate the relation between intending and 
intended, at this transcendentally reduced level, and to guarantee that the 
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determinate specifications of contents of noemata set a standard for distin-
guishing between misleading and adequate designations of noeses.
in the 1930s, perhaps unsurprisingly, Adorno deploys Hegelian ter-
minology more emphatically against Husserl, identifying a problem with 
the lack of mediation between an ego pole, and a pole of what is attend-
ed to in intentionality. Adorno complains that these two are subordinated 
arbitrarily to an enforced sameness, in the imposition of the notion of a 
‘pole.’ This however disregards the differences with respect to noeses and 
noemata pointed out above, and he himself goes on to identify the dis-
tinction between these two poles with the subject-object distinction. He 
then proceeds to prove to his own satisfaction that there can be no direct 
access between them of the kind that he supposes Husserl labors to dem-
onstrate. The lack of dialectical mediation is, however, an objection to a 
formulation, in terms of subjects and objects, but not to Husserl’s formula-
tion, which is precisely not caught up in an unresolved oscillation between 
mutually exclusive modes of conceptual idealism and material actuality. 
it is also remarkable that Adorno has to have been unaware of Husserl’s 
attempts in the papers and lectures written during the 1930s to come to 
terms with a genesis and historical determination of certain, if not all, ideal 
essences. Some of this material was published in 1954, as The Crisis of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, following up the 1939 es-
say on geometry.27 For Husserl, ideality is not to be opposed to historicali-
ty, while Adorno overhastily identifies these Husserlian essences as Platonic 
and as external to history. Husserl, from beginning to end, is clearly in this 
respect anti-Platonic and aware of the emergence of ideality in historical 
time. The publication of the essay “on the origin of geometry” by Fink 
in 1939, in the first volume of the Revue internationale de philosophie, does 
not seem to have informed Adorno’s reception here, or rather only seems 
to have confirmed his mistaken thought that for Husserl all essences exist 
mathematically in pure space time.28 For the upshot of Husserl’s essay is to 
show that even for these essences, there are questions of genesis, sedimen-
tation, and erosion of meaning to be explored.
There is undoubtedly an open question about precisely what the 
connection between philosophy, as rigorous discipline, and history, as the 
context for actual meaning fulfillments, might have been thought by Hus-
serl to be, but Adorno does not pursue it all that far. instead, he substitutes 
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the long discussion in part three of Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, of 
the lack of dialectics in Husserl’s phenomenology; in part four, through a 
congruence between Husserl and Heidegger on phenomenology, he seems 
to attribute to Husserl responsibility for Heidegger’s affirmations of Hitler. 
in Husserl’s favorite observation concerning the universal plague leading 
to the extinction of human life, without bringing the slightest danger to 
that phenomenological remainder, the pure ego, Adorno appears to trace 
the precursor of that nihilism which he attributes to Heidegger. This nihil-
ism can be understood to develop out of the being towards death of Being 
and Time, into the nihilating nothingness of the inaugural lecture “What 
is Metaphysics?” (1929) and the rectoral Address of 1933, and on into the 
alarming tone of the analysis of violence in the lectures Introduction to 
Metaphysics from 1935–36.29 The reference concerning the universal plague 
is to section 49 of Ideas I, where absolute consciousness is adduced as the 
residuum of the abolition of the world (Weltvernichtung). This supposed 
continuity is, however, entirely spurious, even within Heidegger’s texts, 
which rather form a critique of nihilism, and certainly with respect to any 
supposed continuity between Husserl and Heidegger. There is, however, at 
least a consistency in the failure to consider that Husserl may have a no-
tion of history, in parallel with his notions of logic, and of rigorous dis-
ciplinarity, separate from and in contestation with those of Hegel. There 
is throughout a problem with Adorno’s presumption that the idealisms of 
Kant and of Hegel exhaust the possibilities for idealism, and with his re-
fusal to allow for a third idealism that is less irreducibly opposed to an in-
heritance of empiricism and positivism than his reconstructions of Hegel’s 
and Kant’s views.
excursus on Kant
My view is that Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, even when still 
only implicit in the Logical Investigations, provides much more than a the-
ory of cognition; and that it is to be distinguished from Kantian transcen-
dentalism, to the point of promising an alternative account of transcen-
dental aesthetics, not separable from cognition, and not privileging the 
space-time of theories of knowledge, or indeed of mathematics, above the 
space-time of making sense of human existence. For specific human ex-
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istence is predicated of all Husserl’s inquiries about thinking, and this is 
why there must always be a repetition of a reduction to an ideal ego, in 
the attempt to neutralize the effects of such specificity. The confirmation 
or refutation of such neutralization lies in the possibility and impossibil-
ity of re-enacting reduction. Adorno identifies in Husserl an adoption of 
a timeless transcendentalism, direct from Kant, and to this he returns in 
his 1959 lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1995).30 in the writings 
of the 1930s, however, it emerges that Husserl is committed to a drastically 
revised notion of transcendentalism, for which apriorism is not to be op-
posed to the thought of ideas developing in time, in specific historical cir-
cumstances, and is not separable from an articulation of time. Thought for 
Husserl is thus subject to the vicissitudes of historical process, and sedi-
mentation. This is re-thematized by Heidegger, as a process of erosion and 
erasure, which is then subjected to the Heideggerian absolutization as the 
forgetting of being, Seinsvergessenheit, memorably culminating in an obliv-
ion of being. Husserl’s own position is rather more nuanced, and deserves 
to be pursued through the 1920s in the lectures on active and passive syn-
thesis and on transcendental logic.
Adorno declares in his first lecture on Kant: “Thus this interest in 
synthetic a priori judgments is connected with the fact that Kant real-
ly does require truth to be timeless.”31 This notion of a ‘timelessness’ of 
truth requires careful examination, for Kant hypothesizes several forms 
of time, even in the first Critique. There are the conceptions of time and 
space set up, in advance of the analytic of concepts, as pure forms of in-
tuition, which provide the backdrop for a determination of time on each 
occasion of a schematization of concepts, when sensibility and reason are 
set to work, together to produce knowledge of repeating patterns, as re-
identifiable entities. There is then a categorial determination of time, in 
the analytic of principles, in the discussion of the analogies of experience, 
with time there determined as permanence, succession, and co-existence. 
There is then an indication of further dimensions of time, which cannot 
be determinately thought, in relation to the ideas of reason, intimated in 
the postulates of empirical thought. There is finally the surmised time, in 
which the task of transcendental critique is to be developed. However, the 
time of moral judgment is a quite other time, and only the eschatologi-
cal time of divine judgment provides the horizon of reflection required for 
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secure and incontrovertible moral judgment. Human beings, by contrast, 
get their moral judgments wrong, and even if right, cannot know that they 
are right. Famously, the chasm between pure reason and practical reason 
is to be bridged by the third Critique, but even more importantly, the gap 
between the time of human judgment and the time of divine judgment 
is intimated as a problem in the third Critique, in the analytic of the sub-
lime, and again in the separation of an idea of divine providence from that 
of a human prognosis. This last is developed in the essay on whether the 
human race is improving, deteriorating, or remaining on an even keel, in 
“The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law.”32
The relation between the orderly forward directed time of causal se-
quences, and the interrupted time of judgment is set out in outline in an 
interruption of the harmonious order of judgments of taste, in a drawing 
out and slowing down of time, in the formation of judgment, and in a sus-
pension of time, in the experience of magnitude and might introduced in 
the analytic of the sublime.33 it is important first to mark a disagreement 
with Adorno’s reading of Kant; and, second, to refuse his elision of the dif-
ferences between Husserl’s transcendental inquiries and Kant’s apriorism, 
which with somewhat more reason, although still not without the possibil-
ity for challenge, can be thought to be ahistorical and timeless. As a marker 
for the manner in which it might be important to attend more carefully 
than Adorno does to differences between Husserl and Kant, i should in 
conclusion like to draw attention to an ambiguity in the ‘Principle of All 
Principles’, from Ideas I, section 24, which is invoked by both Adorno and 
by derrida in La voix et le phénomène. neither of them marks a significant 
shift in Husserl’s sentence, in part because each is influenced by Kant’s de-
termination of the notion of intuition, thus concealing from them both 
the change in the scope of intuition resulting from Husserl’s innovations. 
i shall give first the german and then the english:
doch genug der verkehrten Theorien. Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: daß jede orig-
inär gebende Anschauung eine rechtsquelle der erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich 
uns in der ‘intuition’ originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, 
einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in der Schranken in 
denen es sich da gibt, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen.34
But enough of such misdirected theorizing. As principle of all principles, no 
such suspect theory can make us go wrong: that every originally given intuition 
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(Anschauung) forms a justified source for knowledge, all of that which offers itself 
in ‘intuition’ (Intuition), that is in a living reality, is simply to be accepted as what 
it gives itself out as, however, only within the limits within which it gives itself.
it would of course be worth pursuing the differences between these 
limits, which are determined on each occasion of givenness, and the lim-
its, set out once and for all by Kant, which sustain and mark out the reli-
able application of concepts. neither Adorno nor derrida however draws 
attention to the shift from Anschauung to Intuition, and neither considers 
its significance. it is the shift from passive synthesis, a habituality in a sur-
rounding world, to active cognizing, in a clarified horizon of lived reality, 
and from a passive givenness, to a positing of the evidential status of the 
evidence. This is a shift from the active existentially committed german 
form to the neutral or suspended Latin form, marking for Husserl a shift 
from a level of phenomenological psychology to that of a reduced tran-
scendental phenomenology, which speaks Latin. now it might be possible 
to challenge this shift, and to argue for the greater philosophical potency 
of the ordinary language use, uncorrected by any attempt at a pseudo neu-
trality, but what is revealed is a process of detecting in the ordinary lan-
guage use the transcendentally given, but perhaps linguistically inarticula-
ble, neutral form. granted Adorno’s attention to and satire with respect to 
the workings in Husserl’s text of notions like “erledigende Arbeite” (tasks to 
be accomplished, rather like a shopping list) and “Innerlichkeit des Leistens” 
(interiority of achievement), it is odd that this more obviously philosophi-
cally inflected modulation should pass unnoticed.
Through Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, as summarized in the 1925 
lectures History of the Concept of Time, the themes of transcendental, or 
categorial, intuition; of apriorism; and the innovation of the concept of 
intentionality come to the fore.35 What is repressed is the role of reduc-
tion; the insistence on the parallelism between phenomenological psychol-
ogy and transcendental phenomenology; and the evolution of the analysis 
of internal time consciousness into a questioning of a connection between 
thinking time and thinking essential structure. This last might have been 
developed into an analysis of temporal and historical indices for all ideal 
essences, not so far from Benjamin’s proposed theory of knowledge, which 
both Benjamin and Adorno conceive as oppositional to that of Husserl. 
There is then the hidden cargo of Adorno, in writing Zur Metakritik der 
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Erkenntnistheorie, attempting to do justice to Benjamin’s critique of phe-
nomenology, although without Benjamin’s gift for transforming critique 
into affirmation. Through Adorno’s readings of Husserl, what emerges is 
more negative than Benjamin’s passing remarks about Husserl. in their 
over-determination these readings reveal the challenge that Husserl’s no-
tions of scientificity, of logic, and even of ahistoricality, pose to Adorno’s 
presumption that Hegel is best on logic and science. My proposal by con-
trast is to read Husserl as providing an open ended thinking of time, re-
sistant both to Adorno’s critique and to Heidegger’s appropriation. it may 
be developed into an understanding of a fluctuating role for conceptions 
of history in thinkings of time, which, with Heidegger, gets blocked by 
the appeal to the opacities of the Ereignis and Enteignis of being, and, with 
Adorno, turns into a petrification of time in a naturalized history, em-
balmed by the movements of commodity fetishism. This intensified no-
tion of commodity fetishism is in my view opposed to a political reading 
of Benjamin’s notion of natural history, which might rather be aligned 
to Husserl’s account of historical aprioris. By contrast the petrification of 
time, analyzed in critiques of capitalism, seems to have something oddly in 
common with Heidegger’s notions of an enframing technicity, as a stalling 
of the ebb and flow of history.36
Polemical Last Paragraph
There is something startlingly irrelevant about the arrival of Hit-
ler’s name on the scene in Adorno’s discussions of Husserl, a brutality that 
Adorno performs, without regard for Husserl’s own experiences as a con-
vert Protestant, pursued even in his manuscripts by Hitler’s minions. There 
is something also rather desperate about Adorno’s attempts to prove that 
everyone else in the world, except himself, is contaminated by proxim-
ity to a black-shirted heritage, when even Heidegger seems to have drawn 
the line at brown shirts. As remarked, there is something distasteful about 
Adorno’s observations on Husserl, drafted in the 1930s in the safety of his 
oxford exile, when Husserl was in there, in Prague, well into his seventies, 
trying to contribute as best he could to the formation of a spiritual and in-
tellectual resistance to the coming disaster. it ill behooves the philosopher 
to abandon the name ‘rigorous science’ in favor of cheap polemics, and 
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it is Husserl, not Adorno, who takes up the task of thinking, not in the 
name of humanity, or in the name of Auschwitz, or even in the name of 
truth, but in his own name, painfully signing and owning every twist and 
turn, every grammatical inflection and hard-won insight. These twists and 
turns, as is now known, drove Heidegger, with his task of redaction, to the 
irritated expostulation that Husserl had got lost in his own manuscripts, 
but it is this care, this detailed work, this personalized craftsmanship, that 
i seek to draw attention to here, and for which i seek to justify the name 
‘poietic epistemology.’
